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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Emotions or feelings?
 
 
According to the biologist Charles Birch (1995:IX), "Feelings are 
what matter most in life"1. While it is debatable whether they really 
matter "most", they certainly matter a great deal; and it is good to see that 
after a long period of scholarly neglect, feelings are now at the forefront 
of interdisciplinary investigations, spanning the humanities, social 
sciences, and biological sciences. 
Some would say: not "feelings", but "emotions" -and the 
question: which of the two (feelings or emotions?) plunges us straight 
into the heart of the central controversy concerning the relationship 
between human biology on the one hand and language and culture on the 
other. 
But there are no neat lines separating disciplines and schools of 
thought which prefer "feelings" to "emotions" or vice versa. Generally 
speaking, the buzz word in the field is "emotions" rather than "feelings". 
There are many reasons for that, but they all seem to have something to 
do with what Birch (1995) calls "the flight from subjectivity". 
Many psychologists appear to be more comfortable with the term 
"emotion" than "feeling" because "emotions" appear to be somehow 
"objective", and it is assumed that only the "objective" is real and 
amenable to rigorous study. Indeed, it is often assumed that "emotions" 
have a biological foundation and can therefore be studied "objectively", 
whereas feelings cannot. 
                                                 
1
 In a similar vein, Needham (1981:99) states: "I take it to be true that what we 
think of as our "real" lives is characteristically an account of our feelings." 
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Seventy years ago the founder of behaviourism John Watson 
proposed the following definition (quoted in Plutchik 1994:3): "An 
emotion is an hereditary 'pattern-reaction' involving profound changes of 
the bodily mechanisms as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and 
glandular systems". While such purely behaviouristic conceptions of 
emotions have now been repudiated, emotions are still often seen as 
something that, for example, can be measured. For example, Plutchik 
(1994:139) himself writes: "Because emotions are complex states of the 
organism involving feelings, behaviour, impulses, physiological changes 
and efforts at control, the measurement of emotions is also a complex 
process". 
 Many anthropologists, too, prefer to talk about "emotions" rather 
than "feelings" -not because of the former's "objective" biological 
foundation but because of their "objective" social basis. (See e.g. Lutz 
1988; White 1993). 
But the word emotion is not as unproblematic as it seems; and by 
taking the notion of emotion as our starting point we may be committing 
ourselves, at the outset, to an ethnocentric perspective which is shaped by 
our own native language, or by the language predominant in the field, 
rather than taking a maximally "free" and culture-independent point of 
view. 
The English word emotion seems to combine in its meaning a 
reference to 'feeling', a reference to 'thinking', and a reference to a 
person's body. For example, one can talk about a "feeling of hunger", or a 
"feeling of heartburn", but not about an "emotion of hunger" or an 
"emotion of heartburn", because the feelings in question are not thought-
related. One can also talk about a "feeling of loneliness" or a "feeling of 
alienation", but not an "emotion of loneliness" or an "emotion of 
alienation", because while these feelings are clearly related to thoughts 
(such as "I am all alone", "I don't belong" etc.), they do not imply any 
associated bodily events or processes (such as rising blood pressure, a 
rush of blood to the head, tears, and so on). 
The English word emotion, however, with its characteristic 
combination of three components (related to feeling, thinking, and the 
body) does not have exact equivalents in other languages. In fact it 
embodies a concept which is itself an artifact of the English language. 
In the hypothetical set of universal human concepts, evolved by 
the author and colleagues over many years' cross-linguistic investigation 
(see below, section 2.1.) 'feel' is indeed one of the elements, but 'emotion' 
is not. If words such as emotion (or, for that matter, sensation) are taken 
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for granted as analytical tools, and if their English-based character is not 
kept in mind, they can reify (for English speakers and English writers) 
inherently fluid phenomena which could be conceptualized and 
categorized in many different ways. Phrases such as "the psychology of 
emotion", or "psychobiological theory of emotion", or "operational 
definition of emotion (such as galvanic skin response, GSR)" create the 
impression that 'emotion' is an objectively existing category, delimited 
from other categories by nature itself, and that the concept of 'emotion' 
carves nature at its joints. But even languages culturally (as well as 
genetically) closely related to English provide evidence of different ways 
of conceptualizing and categorizing human experience2.  
For example, in ordinary German there is no word for 'emotion' at 
all. The word usually used as the translation equivalent of the English 
emotion, Gefühl (from fühlen 'to feel') makes no distinction between 
mental and physical feelings (although contemporary scientific German 
uses increasingly the word Emotion, no doubt borrowed from scientific 
English, while in older academic German the compound 
Gemütsbewegung, literally "movement of the mind", was often used in a 
similar sense). At the same time, the plural form -Gefühle- is restricted to 
cognitively based feelings, although -unlike the English emotion- it 
doesn't imply any "bodily disturbances" or processes of any kind. 
The same is true of Russian, where the noun chuvstvo (from 
chuvstvovat'
 "to feel") corresponds to both feeling and emotion, and 
where the plural form chuvstva suggests cognitively based feelings. (For 
further discussion, see Wierzbicka 1994b). 
I am suggesting, then, that while the concept of 'feeling' is 
universal and can be safely used in the investigation of human experience 
and human nature, (see below, section 2.1.), the concept of 'emotion' is 
culture-bound, and cannot be similarly relied on. 
In a culture where it is common to regard "composure" as a 
person's "normal state", phenomena such as joy, despair, shame, or fear 
may indeed be viewed as a "departure" from the normal, "baseline state". 
The English adjective emotional (with its implications of something 
unusual if not slightly reprehensible), reflects this perspective very 
                                                 
2
 To give just one non-European example, Gerber (1985) notes that Samoans 
have no word corresponding to the English term "emotion", and rely, instead, on 
the notion of 'feeling' (lagona). (See also Ochs 1986:258). 
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clearly, but in a way, so does the noun emotion itself, because (unlike 
Gefühle
 or chuvstva) it links the idea of cognitively based 'feelings' with 
that of 'bodily events'. 
Of course, scholars who debate the nature of 'emotions' are 
interested in something other than just 'feelings'. In fact, the notion that 
"emotions" must not be reduced to "feelings" is one of the few ideas that 
advocates of different approaches to "emotion" (biological, cognitive, and 
socio-cultural) generally strongly agree on (cf., e.g. Schachter & Singer 
1962; Solomon 1984:248, Lutz 1986:295). Since, however, it is the 
concept of 'feel' (rather than the Anglo concept of 'emotion') which is 
universal and untinted by our own culture, it would seem preferable to 
take it as the starting point for any exploration of the area under 
consideration. This need not preclude us from investigating other 
phenomena at the same time. We could ask, for example: When people 
"feel" something, what happens to them (or in them)? What do they do? 
What do they think? What do they say? Do they think they know what 
they feel? Can they identify their feelings for themselves and others? 
Does their interpretation of what they feel depend on what they think they 
should feel, or on what they think people around them think they should 
feel? How are people's reported or presumed feelings related to what is 
thought of, in a given society, as "good" or "bad"? How are they related 
to human interaction? And so on. 
It is interesting to ask, in this context, what exactly some scholars 
mean by "emotion" when they claim that emotions are not cognitively 
based. For example, Izard (1984:24) explicitly states that "emotion has no 
cognitive component. I maintain that the emotion process is bounded by 
the feeling that derives directly from the activity of the neurochemical 
substrates" Yet as examples of "emotions" Izard mentions "shame", 
"anger", "sadness" and so on — and not, for example, "pain", "hunger", 
"thirst", "itch", or "heartburn". In practice, then, Izard, too, distinguishes 
cognitively based ( i.e., thought-related) feelings (such as "shame" or 
"sadness") from purely bodily feelings and calls only the former 
"emotions". While denying that "emotions" are cognitively based he 
doesn't go so far as to include among them "hunger" or "thirst". On what 
basis, then, does he distinguish his "emotions" from hunger, thirst, or 
pain? The very meanings of words such as shame, anger, or sadness on 
the one hand, and hunger or thirst on the other draw a distinction 
between feelings based on thoughts and purely bodily feelings; and the 
word emotion, too, is only used in ordinary language with respect to 
thought-related feelings, never with respect to bodily feelings such as 
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hunger. Thus, in drawing a line between feelings such as "shame" or 
"sadness" on the one hand and "hunger" or "thirst" on the other, even 
"naturalist" scholars such as Izard accept in practice the distinction drawn 
in everyday conceptions -but at the same time they reject this distinction 
at a theoretical level! 
 
1.2. Lexical universals and universal human concepts 
 
To analyse "emotions" (or any other semantic domain) in a clear 
and precise manner we need an appropriate semantic metalanguage. Up 
to a point, informal English can serve well enough, as can also technical, 
academic English. At some point, however, the fundamental concepts on 
which our analysis is based have to be defined clearly and precisely; and 
to define anything (without direct or indirect circularity) we need some 
indefinables. If our indefinables, or primitives, are not intuitively 
intelligible and self-explanatory, then our definitions will explain 
nothing. (Cf. Arnauld 1964[1662]; Couturat 1903/1961; Descartes 
1931[1701]; Pascal 1954[1667]..) 
If we want to define emotion concepts in a way which would be 
truly explanatory we must define them in terms of words which are 
intuitively understandable (non-technical) and which themselves are not 
names of specific emotions or emotional states. This can be done using a 
small set of simple and universal concepts such as 'feel', 'want', 'say', 
'think', 'know', 'good', 'bad', and so on, which have been independently 
justified as plausible candidates for the status of conceptual primitives 
(cf. Bogusáawski 1966, 1970; Goddard 1989; Wierzbicka 1972, 1980, 
1992b, 1996; cf. also the evidence in Goddard and Wierzbicka (eds.) 
1994). The use of such primitives frees our analysis from obvious or 
hidden circularity and provides a framework in terms of which all 
concepts encoded in language (emotion concepts and any other concepts) 
can be clearly and rigorously portrayed. 
Furthermore, the use of conceptual primitives allows us to 
explore human emotions (or any other conceptual domain) from a 
universal, language-independent perspective. Since every language 
imposes (up to a point) its own classification upon human experience, 
language-specific English words such as emotion, sensation, or mood are 
cultural artifacts of the English language, not culture-free analytical tools 
(see Wierzbicka, 1993). On the other hand, conceptual primitives such as 
'good' and 'bad', or 'want', 'know', 'say' and 'think' are not cultural artefacts 
of the English language but belong to the universal "alphabet of human 
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thoughts" (to use Leibniz' phrase, cf. Couturat, 1903/1961, p.430); and 
they do appear to have their semantic equivalents in all languages of the 
world. Basing our analysis on lexical universals we can free ourselves 
from the bias of our own language and reach a universal, culture-
independent perspective on human cognition in general and on human 
emotions in particular. 
Given the non-universality of the concept 'emotion', the 
expression "emotional universals" should also be used with caution and 
always, so to speak, in inverted commas. (Cf. Wierzbicka,1996). In line 
with what was said before even if we are interested, primarily, in 
emotions rather than in feelings in general, it will be safer to formulate 
our research agendas in terms of "universals of (the conceptualization of) 
feeling" rather than in terms of "emotional universals". If for rhetorical or 
other reasons we prefer, nonetheless, to use the latter expression (as I am 
doing in the title of this chapter), we should not let this expression fool 
us, or lull us, into forgetting what in our framework is, what is not truly 
universal and therefore truly reliable. For if we wish to build our 
analytical house on rock we must, ultimately, build it on the foundation 
of universal human concepts. 
The work of the last thirty years undertaken by myself and 
colleagues, and spanning over a wide range of languages, has identified 
nearly sixty candidates for the status of universal semantic primitives, as 
outlined in the table below (for justification and discussion, see Goddard 
& Wierzbicka (eds.) 1994, and Wierzbicka 1996): 
 
Substantives: I, YOU, SOMEONE (PERSON), SOMETHING (THING), 
PEOPLE, BODY 
Determiners: THIS, THE SAME, OTHER  
Quantifiers: ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MANY(MUCH) 
Attributes: GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL 
Mental predicates: THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR 
Speech: SAY, WORD, TRUE 
Actions, events and movement: DO, HAPPEN, MOVE 
Existence and possession: THERE IS, HAVE 
Life and death: LIVE(ALIVE), DIE 
Logical concepts: NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF 
Time: WHEN(TIME), NOW, AFTER, BEFORE, A LONG TIME, A SHORT 
TIME, FOR SOME TIME 
Space: WHERE(PLACE), HERE, UNDER, ABOVE, TOUCH (CONTACT); 
FAR, NEAR; SIDE, INSIDE 
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Intensifier, Augmentor: VERY, MORE 
Taxonomy, partonomy: KIND OF, PART OF 
Similarity: LIKE 
 
As the format of this outline suggests, the proposed set of 
primitives is not an unstructured set, but rather, a network of categories, 
which can be compared (somewhat metaphorically) with the parts of 
speech of traditional grammar. Taken together, these primitives can be 
used as a kind of mini-language, suitable for the description and 
comparison of meanings. In what follows, I will try to rely (as far as 
possible) on this mini-language in trying to formulate testable hypotheses 
about "emotional universals". 
 
1.3. Are there any "universal human emotions"? 
 
Nothing is more persistent in the study of human emotions than 
the belief that they can all be reduced to a small number of universal and 
innate emotions found in all ("normal") human beings, and also, that 
these supposedly innate and universal emotions can be identified by 
means of English emotion terms such as fear, anger, or sadness. To quote 
a recent statement by a proponent of this idea, Plutchik (1994:54): This 
(...) approach makes the assumption that a small number of emotions are 
considered primary or fundamental or basic, and that all other emotions 
are secondary, derived mixtures, or blends of the primary ones. From 
this perspective, one needs to identify the basic emotions and then 
explain which mixed emotions or blends are derived from them. Over the 
centuries, many philosophers and psychologists have proposed lists of 
basic emotions. 
Plutchik points out that in recent times the old theory of "basic 
emotions" has, if anything, gained in popularity; and that although many 
different lists of "basic emotions" have been proposed, there is 
nonetheless some consensus concerning at least some emotions: In the 
last three decades numerous investigators have embraced the concept of 
"basic emotions". (...) These theorists all agree that a small number of 
emotions qualify as primary emotions. The smallest number is three and 
the largest number is eleven, while most proposals list five to nine 
emotions. Also of interest is the fact that certain emotions such as fear 
and anger appear on every list. Sadness (or its synonym grief, distress, or 
loneliness) appears on all but two lists.
 (p.57) 
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In justifying the claim that emotions such as fear, anger, or 
sadness are innate and universal, many scholars appeal to the (alleged) 
fact that these particular emotions "are found in all cultures". As Plutchik 
(Ibid.) reports: 
Kemper (1987) believes that there are at least four 
physiologically based primary emotions: fear, anger, sadness, and 
satisfaction. He argues that the rationale for considering them as primary 
is that they can be observed (or inferred) in most animals, that they are 
universally found in all cultures, that they appear early in the course of 
human development, that they are outcomes of power and status 
interactions, and that they are associated with distinct autonomic patterns 
of physiological changes. These are important points in that they 
represent an explicit justification for considering certain emotions as 
primary. 
 Similarly, Ortony and Turner (1990) point out that the usual 
reasons that theorists give for assuming the existence of primary 
emotions is that: (1) some emotions appear to exist in all cultures; (2) 
some can be identified in higher animals; (3) some have characteristic 
facial expressions; and (4) some seem to increase the chances of survival. 
(Emphasis added). 
Some of the claims which have been made in recent literature 
about the alleged "basic emotions" are bizarre. Thus for example Plutchik 
suggests that "joy (or near equivalents such as love, pleasure, elation, 
happiness, or satisfaction) appears on every list." If emotions as different 
as joy, love, pleasure, elation, happiness, or satisfaction can be regarded 
as "near equivalents", then the whole idea of trying to identify some 
universal emotions and to draw specific lists of such emotions, seems 
rather pointless. (The same applies to Plutchik's list of "sadness", "grief", 
"distress", and "loneliness", described by him as "synonyms".) If, on the 
other hand, the intended claim is that people distinguish, universally, 
between "positive emotions" and "negative emotions", then this should be 
stated explicitly, and terms such as "love", "joy" and "pleasure", or 
"sadness" and "loneliness" should not be called "near-equivalents" or 
"synonyms". 
Other suggestions made by the proponents of "basic emotions" 
may seem more plausible, for example, the idea that "fear", "anger", and 
"sadness" may correspond to some shared aspects of human emotional 
experience, and human genetic endowment. But a growing body of 
literature has established that despite its apparent plausibility this idea, 
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too, is hardly tenable. (See, e.g. Rosaldo 1980, Lutz 1988; Wierzbicka 
1992a and b, 1994a, 1998; White 1992). 
Speaking about the "uncritical presumption that in their 
emotional lives human beings anywhere are by and large essentially 
alike", Needham (1981:99) remarked that "it calls for very little 
acquaintance with history or ethnography to provoke the serious doubt 
that this view can be correct", and he commented: 
For a comparativist, the prime field of evidence is presented by 
vocabularies of emotion in different linguistic traditions; and the first 
lesson is that simply in the numbers of emotions discriminated they 
diverge very greatly. 
But numerous influential recent writers on emotions have simply 
ignored such warning. 
As William James noted, we know from introspection that, on the 
one hand, we are capable of a great variety of feelings, and on the other, 
that these different feelings are not clearly separated from one another 
and could not be counted. Furthermore, as James also noted, upon this 
largely nebulous world of feelings every language imposes its own 
interpretive grid: ... if one should seek to name each particular one of 
[the emotions] of which the human heart is the seat, it is plain that the 
limit to their number would lie in the introspective vocabulary of the 
seeker, each race of men having found names for some shade of feeling 
which other races have left undiscriminated. If we should seek to break 
the emotions, thus enumerated, into groups, according to their affinities, 
it is again plain that all sorts of groupings would be possible, according 
as we chose this character or that as a basis, and that all groupings 
would be equally real and true
 (1890:485). 
Thus, the way people interpret their own emotions depends, to 
some extent at least, on the lexical grid provided by their native language. 
Two different creatures (e.g. a large nocturnal moth attracted by lights 
and a clothes moth) may be classified as "the same kind of creature" (in 
English) and as "two different kinds of creature" in Polish (   ma and mól 
respectively), and conversely, two different animals (e.g. a mouse and a 
rat) may be classified as "two different kinds of animal (in English) and 
as "the same kind of animal" in another language (e.g., nezumi in 
Japanese). The same applies to emotions: whether or not two feelings are 
interpreted as two different instances of, essentially, "the same emotion" 
or as instances of "two different emotions" depends largely on the 
language through the prism of which these emotions are interpreted. 
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It is ethnocentric to think that if the Tahitians don't have a word 
corresponding to the English word sad (Levy 1973), they must 
nonetheless have an innate conceptual category of "sadness"; or to 
assume that in their emotional experience "sadness" - for which they have 
no name - is nonetheless more salient and more relevant than, for 
example, the feelings of t•iaha or pe'ape'a, for which they do have a 
name (although English does not). 
Obviously, there is no reason to think that Tahitians are incapable 
of feeling "sad"; but neither is there any reason to believe that the 
speakers of English are incapable of feeling "t•iaha" or "pe'ape'a". Above 
all, there is no reason to think that "sadness" is more important or more 
"universal" than "t•iaha" or "pe'ape'a". 
The conceptual categories of "sadness" or "anger" are highly 
relevant to the speakers of English, and also to the speakers of other 
languages which have words corresponding in meaning to the English 
words sad and angry or sadness and anger. In many other cultures, 
however, the conceptual grid provided by language is different. As in the 
case of "emotion" itself, to find examples of such differences, we don't 
have to refer to "exotic" languages accessible only to a narrow range of 
specialists: we can find them easily in German, Italian, or Russian. (Cf. 
Wierzbicka, 1992b, 1994a and b, 1998, In press). 
 
1.2 A new approach to the search for emotional universals 
 
It is often assumed that if one emphasises the differences in the 
emotional lexicon of different languages, and in particular, if one refuses 
to accept the universality of concepts such as 'anger', 'fear', or 'sadness', 
one is ipso facto embracing cultural relativism and rejecting the 
possibility of there being any "emotional universals". This isn't 
necessarily true, however, and certainly not in my own case. But false 
universals are a major obstacle in our search for true universals; and in 
searching for the latter we must, first of all, debunk the former. Since 
false universals arise, first of all, from the absolutization of distinctions 
drawn by one's native language, close attention to such ethnocentric traps 
is of prime importance. As Sapir (1949:165) put it, "The philosopher 
needs to understand language if only to protect himself against his own 
language habits". 
Three levels of phenomena need to be distinguished here: (1) the 
psychological phenomena themselves; (2) the conceptualization of these 
phenomena; (3) the words and expressions linked in a given language for 
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the concepts in question. Ideally, these three levels of analysis should be 
signalled by typographic distinctions. For example, we could write about 
the phenomenon of ANGER, the concept of 'anger', and the English word 
anger; and also, about "anger" in some undifferentiated sense, discussed 
in the literature. In practice it is not always feasible to rely on such 
typographic distinctions in a fully consistent manner. The crucial point to 
remember, however, is that while the phenomenon of ANGER (singled 
out for our attention by the English word anger) is of course real, it is no 
more real than the phenomenon of RABBIA or SONG, singled out for 
other people's attention by the Italian word rabbia and the Ifaluk word 
song, and that the concept of 'anger' associated with the English word 
anger
 is no more revealing of human nature in general than the concept 
of 'rabbia', or the concept of 'song'. 
If such distinctions are not carefully maintained, confusion sets 
in, often giving rise to fruitless controveries obscuring the real issues. To 
illustrate. Lutz (1986) rightly attacked "the tendency to treat [English] 
emotion concepts as conceptual primitives and universals" and charged 
that "in the cross-cultural context, Western ideas about the nature of 
emotion have set the terms for descriptions of the emotional lives of 
cultural 'others'" (p.47). But the impact of Lutz's well justified attack on 
the wide-spread ethnocentrism in the study of emotions may have 
suffered from her concomitant claim that emotions do not "happen 'inside' 
the person" (p.11), but somehow "outside", in the "society", and that they 
have to be treated as social, cultural, and moral rather than psychological, 
phenomena. 
In fact there is no conflict between the view that "indigenous 
conceptualizations of emotions" (p.43) are shaped by culture and are 
often concerned with interpersonal relations and the view that emotions 
happen "inside a person". Furthermore, even if one wants to claim that 
not only emotion concepts but also emotions themselves can be culturally 
shaped, there is still no need to deny that those culturally shaped 
emotions happen "inside a person". Both words and concepts embodied 
in them are cultural artefacts, which evolve in a given society, and which 
are shared by people living in that society; but feelings are indeed 
"internal", subjective, and likely to be associated with "private" bodily 
events and processes. There is no conflict between accepting this and 
maintaining at the same time that people think, talk and interpret their 
feelings in terms of conceptualizations provided by their language and 
culture. 
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What applies to specific "emotion terms" such as anger or 
sadness
 applies also to the term emotion itself; for while the phenomenon 
of EMOTION is real enough, it is no more real than the phenomena of 
GEFÜHLE or CHUVSTVA, singled out for attention by the German word 
Gefühle
 (plural) or the Russian word chuvstva (also plural), and linked 
with the concepts 'Gefühle' and 'chuvstva', overlapping with but different 
from the concept of 'emotion'. 
William James' point about "all sorts of groupings [being] 
possible" (...), all of them "equally real and true", applies to "emotions" in 
general as much as it does to specific feelings such as "anger" or 
"sadness". This is why in order to free our search for "emotional 
universals" from a culture-specific perspective it is good to rely in our 
discussion, as far as possible, on universal human concepts. This is what I 
will try to do in the survey which follows. 
An analogy from the research into "colour universals" may be 
useful here. Many languages don't have a word for "colour", and in many 
societies people talk habitually about visual experience without 
separating the"colour" of various things from other aspects of their 
appearance. Even in English there are words like gold or silver, (referring 
not only to colour but also to a shining appearance), and in many other 
languages words of this kind appear to be the rule rather than an 
exception. A classic example is Hanun•o (cf. Conklin 1955), where, for 
example, the closest equivalent of green, latuy, is more properly glossed 
as "looking like plants when they have a lot of juice inside" (i.e. fresh, 
succulent-looking, probably -but not necessarily- green). 
The search for "colour universals" initiated by Berlin and Kay's 
1969 classic has ultimately proved misguided (see, e.g. van Brakel 1992) 
precisely because it approached human ways of thinking and talking 
about "seeing" in terms of a preconceived and non-universal notion of 
"colour"; and also in terms of preconceived and non-universal concepts 
such as 'black', 'white', 'red' and 'green'. 
While Berlin and Kay's error proved fruitful (for although their 
theory finally collapsed, a great deal was learnt in the process) this error 
should not be endlessly repeated in the case of emotions. The concept of 
'emotion' is no more universal than the concept of 'colour', and conceptual 
categories such as 'anger', 'sadness', or 'surprise' are no more universal 
than the conceptual categories 'white', 'red', 'green', or 'blue'. For example, 
the English concept of 'anger' is linked with a cognitive scenario which 
includes the following components: 
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(a) this person did something bad 
(b) I don't want this person to do things like this 
(c) I want to do something to this person because of this 
 
 By contrast, the cognitive scenario linked with the Ifaluk concept 
'song' includes components (a) and(b) above, but not (c); and this is why 
'song' may manifest itself in sulking, refusal to eat, or even attempted 
suicide, whether 'anger' normally manifests itself in an action aimed at the 
offender, not at oneself. (See Lutz 1988; Wierzbicka 1992a). 
Just as 'anger' doesn't match 'song', the English concept of 'blue' 
doesn't match the Russian concept 'goluboj' (sky blue), the Polish concept 
'niebieski' or the Japanese concept 'aoi'. (For discussion, see Wierzbicka 
1996). 
This doesn't mean that there are no "universals of seeing", or that 
there are no "universals of feeling", but it does mean that in our search 
for these universals we should carefully listen to how people in different 
cultures talk about what they see, and how they feel (cf. White 1992); and 
that we should avoid analytical categories based on culture-specific 
aspects of our own languages. 
 
2. A proposed set of "emotional universals" 
 
In this section (2.1. - 2.10.) I am going to survey ten or so 
"emotional universals" which emerge from the relevant portions of many 
linguistic and ethnographic studies of diverse languages and cultures. 
One or two of these universals are proposed here as firm findings, but 
most have the status of working hypotheses, with varying degrees of 
empirical support available thus far. 
As particularly rigorous from a methodological point of view I 
regard the studies of the concept FEEL included in the volume Semantic 
and Lexical Universals
 (Goddard & Wierzbicka, eds., 1994), which was 
devoted in its entirety to an empirical search for conceptual universals, 
and which addressed directly the various methodological dilemmas 
involved in such a search. But a wealth of relevant data and observations 
can of course be found in reputable and methodologically informed 
modern "grammars" of various languages, as well as in other descriptive 
linguistic studies, particularly those focussed on emotions. A great deal 
of information is also available in recent anthropological literature, and in 
particular, in the writings of scholars such as Rosaldo (1980), Lutz 
(1988), Howell (1981), White (1993), and many others. 
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On the basis of the evidence gleaned from both linguistic and 
ethnographic studies I would like to propose the following set of working 
hypotheses: 
 
1. All languages have a word for FEEL 
2. In all languages, some feelings can be described as "good" and some as 
"bad" (while some may be viewed as neither "good" nor "bad". 
3. All languages have "emotive" interjections (i.e. interjections 
expressing cognitively-based feelings). 
4. All languages have some "emotion terms" (i.e. terms for cognitively-
based feelings). 
5. All languages have words overlapping (though not identical) in 
meaning with the English words angry, afraid, and ashamed. 
6. All languages have words comparable (though not necessarily 
identical) in meaning to cry and smile. 
7. In all languages, people can describe cognitively-based feelings via 
observable bodily symptoms. 
8. In all languages, cognitively-based feelings can be described via 
figurative "bodily images". 
9. In all languages, there are alternative grammatical constructions for 
describing (and interpreting) cognitively-based feelings. 
 
In what follows, I will discuss these nine putative universals one by one. 
 
2.1. A word for FEEL 
 
As mentioned earlier, all languages have a word for FEEL, 
undifferentiated between "bodily feelings" (sensations) and "cognitively-
based" feelings ("emotions"). This word doesn't have to be a verb — it 
can be an adjective, or a noun; but cross-linguistic surveys conducted to 
date suggest that all languages do have some word corresponding in 
meaning to the English feel — not in all its senses, but in the basic 
"psychological" sense which can be illustrated with the following 
sentences: 
I feel like this now. 
I don't feel anything. 
I can't describe what I felt. 
How are you feeling? 
I felt as if I was going to die. 
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The claim that all languages do have a word for FEEL (in this 
sense) has often been denied, but a closer examination of the evidence 
suggests that such denials were premature or misguided. In particular, the 
claims that a given language doesn't have a word for FEEL are often 
followed by a statement that in this language to say the equivalent of "I 
feel good" or "I feel bad" one has to say "my liver is good" and "my liver 
is bad", or "my insides are good" and "my insides are bad" (see e.g. Lutz 
1988; Howell 1981; Levy 1973). What statements of this kind show is 
that the languages in question do have a word for FEEL (in the relevant 
sense) but that this word is not a verb (as in English), but a noun, and that 
it is a noun which, in a different sense, means 'liver' or 'insides'. 
Cross-linguistic investigations show that the pattern of polysemy 
which links 'feel' with 'liver', 'insides', or 'stomach' is very common (cf. 
Goddard 1994), and since facts of this kind cannot possibly be interpreted 
in terms of "vagueness", they are perfectly consistent with the claim that 
FEEL is a lexical and semantic universal. 
For example, Howell (1981:139) notes that while popular 
conceptions in the West contrast the head and the heart as the organs of 
thought and feelings, the Chewong people of Malaysia "make no such 
explicit distinction. (...) The liver, rus, on the other hand, is the seat of 
both what we call "thoughts" and "feelings", and they do not make any 
conceptual distinction between the two. In fact, they have no word for 
"think" or "feel". Whenever they do express verbally emotional and 
mental states and changes, this is done through the medium of liver. 
Thus, they may say, "my liver is good" (I'm feeling fine)". 
But if the Chewong really made no distinction between thoughts 
and feelings, then why should the sentence "my liver is good" mean 'I'm 
feeling fine' rather than 'I think well'? The very gloss offered by Howell 
suggests that one of the meanings of rus (liver) is simply 'feel', not some 
mixture of feeling and thinking. 
As for thinking, it is noticeable that in the Chewong myths edited 
by Howell (1982 and 1984) references to thinking do occur from time to 
time, as in the following sentences: 
 
The woman thought she was pregnant. (1982:255) 
Bòngso was born and the pandanus woman thought that he was a 
real baby
 (1982:255) 
They were asleep, but he thought they were dead. (1982:253) 
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It is possible that the Chewong word translated here by Howell as 
"think" is a loan from Malay, for in a more recent work Howell (In press) 
writes: They [the Chewong] do not distinguish between thinking and 
feeling. In fact, as far as I could make out, they do not have indigenous 
verbs for these processes. 
But even if the verb for 'think' is in fact a loan from Malay, this 
would not, in my view, disqualify it from being a valid exponent of the 
primitive THINK, for, first, a loan from Malay may have been in use for 
hundreds of years, and second, it may well have replaced an earlier 
indigenous word. Nor is it necessary for a valid exponent of either FEEL 
or THINK to be a verb: a noun like rus (1. liver, 2. feel) may well do as 
an exponent of FEEL if, as Howell herself tells us, "my rus is good" 
means, unambiguously, 'I feel good'.(Cf. Goddard 1996). 
Linguistic evidence suggests that it is not true that some 
languages fail to distinguish between THINKING and FEELING, and 
that in fact both these categories are a necessary ingredient of the 
universal "folk model" of a person (cf. D'Andrade 1987; Bruner 1990) 
-alongside THINK, KNOW, and WANT. 
Where cultures do differ is in the extent, as well as character, of 
their "feel-talk". But this is a different matter altogether: the basic 
conceptual, and linguistic resources for talking about matters relating to 
feelings are always there. On the other hand, whether the main focus of 
such talk is psychological, moral, or social, depends on the culture. For 
example the great importance of "feel-talk" in American culture (cf. 
Bellah et al. 1985) is clearly in sharp contrast to the avoidance of "feel 
talk" in many other cultures, such as, for example, Japanese culture (see 
e.g. Lebra 1976) or Chewong culture (Howell 1981). 
 
2.2. "Feel good" and "feel bad" 
 
It appears that in all languages feelings can sometimes be 
described as "good" or "bad". For example, in English, one can say "I feel 
good" and "I feel bad", or "I feel awful" and "I feel wonderful"; and, as 
mentioned earlier, in Chewong one can say "my liver is good" meaning 'I 
feel well' or "my liver is bad" meaning 'I feel bad'.  
A few further illustrations. In the Australian language Yankunytjatjara 
people say (Goddard 1994:239): 
 
Ngayulu
 
tjuni
 
palya/kura
 
I belly good/bad 
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'I feel good/bad' 
 
 Similarly, in another Australian language, Kayardild (Evans 
1994:212) one uses the word bardaka 'stomach' to refer to good and bad 
feelings: 
 
mirraa
 
bardaka
 
good stomach/feeling 
birdiya 
 
bardaka
 
bad stomach/feeling 
 In other languages, one simply combines a word for FEEL with a 
word for GOOD or BAD (as in English). Hale (1994:269) provides 
examples from Misumalpan languages of Nicaragua, such as the 
following: 
 
yamni
 
ka-daka-yang
 
good feel 
'I feel good' 
 
 And Hill (1994:317) provides a similar example from the 
Austronesian language Longgu: 
 
Un
 
vadangi
 
meta/ta'a
 
I feel good/bad 
'I feel good/bad' 
 
 In Japanese, one can use the expressions ii kimochi or warui 
kimochi
 (good or bad feeling), also with reference to unspecified 
(physical or mental) feelings. One example (from a Japanese novel, 
quoted in Hasada, 1997; see also Onishi 1994): Watashi wa konya wa, ii 
kimochi deshita. Bunji-san to Eiji-san to anata to, rippa na kodomo ga 
sannin narande suwatte iru tokoro o mitara, NAMIDA GA DERU hodo, 
ureshikatta'. 'I feel very good tonight. When I saw you and Bunji and Eiji 
sitting next to one another, I was so happy I almost wept' (for further 
illustrations and discussion, see Goddard and Wierzbicka, eds., 1994). 
 The hypothesis that feelings can be described, universally, as 
either good or bad is of course in keeping with the view often expressed 
by psychologists that emotions are usually "valenced" or that they usually 
have a positive or negative "hedonic tone". For example, Plutchik 
(1994:109) points out that "a common practice is to group emotion words 
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into two broad categories called positive affect and negative affect"; and 
he states that an "important characteristic that is part of our experience of 
emotions is their bipolar nature" (p.65). 
Some scholars go so far as to regard this "bipolar" character of 
emotions as one of their defining qualities. For example, Ortony, Clore, 
and Collins (1988:13) define emotions as "valenced reactions to events, 
agents, or objects, with their particular nature being determined by the 
way in which the eliciting situation is construed." 
Linguistic evidence suggests that feelings are not always 
interpreted as good or bad, and some emotion terms (such as, for 
example, surprise or amazement in English) do not imply any evaluation 
(although the closest counterpart in, for example, Malay, does imply 
evaluation; see Goddard 1997). On the other hand, it does seem to be true 
that feelings are often conceptualized as either "good" or bad", and that in 
all languages people can talk of "good feelings" and "bad feelings" (of 
"feeling good" and "feeling bad"). 
 
2.3. Emotive interjections
 
 
All languages have special words ("interjections") which are used 
to express what one might call "cognitively-based feelings", that is 
feelings linked with specific thoughts, such as, for example, gee!, wow! 
or yuk! in English. The shared meaning of all such words can be 
represented as follows: 
 
I feel something now 
because I think something now 
 
What exactly one feels is not described directly but can be 
gleaned from the content of the thought on which the feeling is based.  
For example, Ochs (1988:173) in her study of Samoan language 
and culture development cites the following Samoan interjections, among 
others: ola "surprise", uoia "surprise/sympathy etc.", visa "negative 
surprise", isa "annoyance", a'e "disapproval", tae "anger". Ochs' glosses 
are of course no more than approximations, but they clearly indicate a 
combination of feeling ('I feel something') with a thought. On the basis of 
Ochs' hints, we can hypothesize that these thoughts may have the 
following content: 
 
ola → I didn't think this would happen 
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visa
 
→
 this is bad 
I didn't think this would happen 
voia →
 something bad happened to this person 
I didn't think this would happen 
isa →  something bad is happening 
I don't want this to be happening 
I don't want to say: it is very bad 
a'e →  this person did something bad 
tae →
 this person did something bad 
I don't want this person to do things like this 
As noted by Wilkins (1992), interjections are present even in the 
American Sign Language. Wilkins discusses, in particular, a sign usually 
glossed as "pity; sympathy; mercy". Presumably, the cognitive 
component of this sign can be represented along the following lines: 
 
something bad happened to this person 
[I want to do something good for this person because of this ?]  
(For a detailed discussion of many interjections from languages 
as different as Swahili and Ewe (Africa), Arrernte and Mayali (Australia) 
or Thai, see papers in Ameka (ed.), 1992; for a detailed analysis of many 
Polish and Russian interjections see Wierzbicka 1991). The existence of 
such words in all languages shows that although the universal concept 
FEEL is undifferentiated and makes no distinction between "bodily 
feelings" ("sensations") and "cognitively-based feelings" ("emotions"), 
all cultures recognize that some feelings are based on thoughts. It also 
shows that in all cultures people sometimes want to voice some such 
feelings by expressing them directly in a first person mode. 
 
2.4. "Emotion" terms 
All languages have some words for describing (rather than 
merely voicing) feelings based on certain thoughts, such as, for example, 
anger
 (angry), shame (ashamed), or surprise (surprised) in English. 
These words don't have to match in meaning across languages, but they 
all combine (in addition to various others) the following two components: 
 
someone thinks something 
because of this, this person feels something 
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Furthermore, words of this kind attempt to describe the nature of the 
feelings in question -not directly, but via the cognitive prototype. This 
can be represented as follows: 
 
Person X was angry/sad/ashamed/worried etc. => 
person X thought something 
because of this, X felt something 
sometimes a person thinks something like this: [Y] 
because of this, this person feels something 
person X thought something like this 
because of this, X felt something like this 
The child psychologist Paul Harris (1989:103) writes: Thus, 
children do not begin their emotional lives by learning a script from their 
culture. They are born with the capacity to experience basic emotions of 
sadness, anger and joy when desirable goals are lost or blocked or 
achieved. They also come to understand that other people may 
experience those emotions. 
Harris's three scenarios (1st "desirable goals lost", 2nd "desirable 
goals blocked", 3d "desirable goals achieved") are clearly modelled on the 
English lexicon, although here, too, the "fit" is far from perfect (for 
example, when my goals are achieved, I'm likely to feel pleased rather 
than joyful; both joy and sadness can be disinterested and unrelated to 
personal "goals"; furthermore, the metaphor of "losing one's goals" is 
unclear and could be applied to apathy rather than sadness; anger can be 
caused by an insult rather than by an obstacle to one's goals, and so on. 
For further discussion, see Wierzbicka 1992a and b.) 
But even if we assumed that the three cognitive scenarios 
formulated in terms of goals fitted the English folk-psychology well 
enough, they certainly don't fit that expressed in other languages. There is 
no reason to assume that these particular cognitive scenarios specified by 
Harris are innate, universal, and independent of culture. What is, in all 
probability, innate and universal, is, above all, concepts such as WANT, 
FEEL, I, HAPPEN, DO, NOT, GOOD and BAD; and also, certain ways 
of combining such concepts into meaningful configurations, such as, for 
example, 'I want this', 'I don't want this', 'I want to do something', 'I can't 
do anything', 'I feel something'. 
But while the cognitive scenarios encoded in the English words 
anger, sadness, and joy (or Harris's somewhat arbitrary approximations 
of them) are not universal and cannot be plausibly regarded as innate, the 
basic conceptual pattern combining a cognitive component ('I think X') 
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with a feeling component ('I feel something') does seem to be universal; 
for all languages provide lexically encoded examples of it. 
 
2.5. "Fear-like" words, "anger-like" words, "shame-like" words
 
 
Different languages "choose", so to speak, different cognitive 
scenarios as reference points for their emotional concepts, and no such 
scenarios are universal. At the same time, there are certain components of 
the cognitive scenarios which appear to be universal as reference points 
for emotion concepts. As a very rough approximation, these components 
can be described as "fear-like", "anger-like", and "shame-like". I will 
discuss these three categories in three separate sections (A, B, and C) 
below3. 
A. All languages appear to have some words overlapping in 
meaning with English words such as fear, afraid, scared, fright, or 
anxiety. In fact, in many languages the family in question (which can be 
called, roughly and arbitrarily, the "fear" family) is much more 
differentiated than it is in English. For example, Bugenhagen (1990:208) 
makes the following comments about "fear-like" words and expressions 
in Mbula: Life in an animistic society is very fragile. Dangers abound. 
Sickness, sorcery, malevolent spirits, jealous neighbours are all potential 
threats. It is hardly surprising, then, that out of all the different emotions, 
                                                 
3
 While the ways of talking about feelings not based on or associated with 
specific thoughts are outside the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that all 
languages appear to have at least three words (or phrases) with a core meaning 
corresponding roughly to that of hunger, thirst and pain. These core meanings 
can be represented as follows: 
I am hungry (thirsty) → 
if a person doesn't eat (drink) anything for a long time 
this person feels something in the body 
because of this, this person wants to eat (drink) 
I feel like this now 
it hurts (I am in pain) → 
if something bad is happening to a part of a person's body 
this person feels something in this part of the body 
this person wants not to feel this 
I feel something like this now (in part X of my body) 
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fear appears to have the broadest range of encodings. Key parameters in 
delineating the various encodings are: 
1. Does the fear have a particular object? 
2. Does one fear for himself or for someone else? 
3. Does one fear physical harm to oneself? 
4. Is the feared entity proximate? 
5. Is the fear the result of one's having done something? 
6. Is the fear a response to having 'felt' some sensation? 
7. Is the feared entity a spirit? 
8. Is the fear a response to something having happened? 
 
Given that all these "fear-like" words in both English and Mbula 
differ in meaning from one another, we cannot assume that all languages 
will have a word for "fear" in some constant sense. What we can 
hypothesize, however, is that all languages will have some word or words 
including the following two semantic components: 
 
something bad can happen (to me) 
I don't want this to happen 
 
These two crucial components can be combined with various 
other ones, and a language may have numerous lexical distinctions in this 
area, but the evidence available suggests that every language will have at 
least one word relating, roughly speaking, to "danger" and to "wish to 
avoid danger" ('something bad can happen to me, I don't want this to 
happen'). Given the human existential condition, this clearly makes sense. 
 
B. All languages appear to have a word which shares two 
semantic components with the English word anger. These two 
components are: 
 
I don't want this to happen 
I want to do something because of this 
 
In many languages, these two components are combined with a 
"negative judgement" component: 'someone did something bad', but this 
doesn't have to be the case. For example, the Ilongot word liget (see 
Rosaldo 1980), which can refer to, for example, "fierce work in one's 
garden", clearly does not include such a component. But liget, too, refers 
to something undesirable: the idea that people may think that I am not as 
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good as other people. In addition, liget (glossed by Rosaldo, inter alia, as 
"energy") contains (like anger) an "active" component 'I want to do 
something'. 
In the case of angry (angry with) and many other similar words in 
other languages, this "active" component refers to a punitive or 
retaliatory action, which in general terms can be represented as 'I want to 
do something to this person (because of this)'. But not all languages have 
a word including such a component; and, for example, liget does not. 
While the "liget" of young men taking part in a head-hunting expedition 
may seem to be highly compatible with such a component, the liget of 
people working "fiercely" (that is, with liget) in their gardens is clearly 
not. 
In the case of liget, the absence of a component 'I want to do 
something to this person' may seem to be due to the absence of a 
component 'this person did something bad'; but the assumption that 
someone did something bad (present in anger but absent from liget) does 
not always lead to the presence of such a punitive or retaliatory 
component. For example, the Ifaluk word song (Lutz 1987, 1988) does 
imply a negative judgment ('this person did something bad') but does not 
imply a desire for punishment or retaliation ('I want to do something to 
this person because of this'). What all these words (anger, liget, song, and 
so on) do imply, is a desire for action ('I want to do something because of 
this'), where the causal subcomponent 'because of this' refers to 
something undesirable or unacceptable ('I don't want this to happen'). 
It should be noted that the word encoding the two components 
posited here as possibly universal does not have to coincide with the 
word usually translated into English as anger (angry), and that it doesn't 
have to be a particularly salient word in the emotion lexicon. For 
example, in Javanese the word nesu, usually glossed in English as angry, 
apparently doesn't include in its meaning the component "I want to do 
something (because of this)". On the other hand, the word ngamuk, 
roughly 'uncontrollable rage', which clearly does include this component, 
is less salient, more marginal in Javanese than nesu 
('annoyed/upset/resentful'). 
Salient or not, however, it can be said that the Javanese word 
ngamuk
 ('uncontrollable rage') does fit the bill; for although it doesn't 
mean the same as anger it does, nonetheless, include in its meaning the 
two components posited here as universal: 'I don't want this to happen', 'I 
want to do something because of this'. 
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Why should all languages have (if they do) an emotion term 
comparable (in two cognitive components) to anger? Some may seek an 
answer to this question in theories of "aggression" as a (supposedly) 
common ingredient of "human nature". But words like liget or song 
cannot be legitimately described in terms of "agression", for they lack the 
crucial component 'X wants to do something bad to Y'. One cannot say, 
therefore, that if "fear-like" words are universally associated with an 
impulse, or need, to run away, "anger-like" words are universally 
associated with an impulse, or need, to fight. 
Rather, we have to conclude that "anger-like" words (including 
those like liget and song) document a universal human impulse, and need, 
to "act" (to do something), in order to prevent the occurrence, or the 
repetition, of some undesirable events. Clearly, this, too, makes sense in 
terms of the universal human condition. 
Turning now to "shame-like" emotions, we must note, first of all, 
that the area in question is particularly variable, and that the idea that all 
languages would have a word identical in meaning to the English shame 
(or that all cultures would have a concept matching the English concept 
'shame') is profoundly mistaken. (See e.g. Harkins, 1996). 
Nonetheless, it seems likely that all languages have a word (or 
words) referring to what might be called "social emotions" (cf. Goddard 
1995). This means, above all, words referring in their meaning to 'people' 
and to what people may think about us, and in particular, conveying a 
concern about "bad things" that people may think about us. More 
precisely, the cognitive components in question can be represented as 
follows: 
people can think something bad about me 
I don't want this 
Judging by lexical evidence, a concern of this kind appears to be 
universal, and it is universally linked with feelings. The universal core 
meaning of the words in question can, therefore, be represented as 
follows: 
someone thinks something like this: 
people can think something bad about me 
I don't want this to happen 
because of this, this person feels something 
 
Why should all languages have a word linking feelings with other 
people's (real or imagined) disapproval? Presumably, because we are not 
Robinson Crusoes, and have to live among other people, and with other 
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people. In the highly individualistic modern Anglo culture, this concern 
for other people's possible disapproval may appear to have diminished, 
and the importance of the concept of 'shame' has indeed diminished in 
modern times. (See e.g. Lynd 1958; Braithwaite 1989.) At the same time, 
however, another "social" emotion — 'embarrassment' — emerged and 
came to play a key role in this culture (Scheff and Retzinger 1991; Quinn 
and Holland 1995). 
The two main differences between shame and embarrassment 
appears to have to do with what is seen as an objective basis for people's 
possible disapproval in the case of shame, and with the 'people here now' 
aspect of embarrassment (one can feel ashamed, but not embarrassed, 
when alone). The two concepts can be represented as follows (for 
detailed discussion, see Wierzbicka, in press): 
 
Shame (X was ashamed) 
(a) X felt something because X thought something 
(b) sometimes a person thinks: 
(c) "people can know something bad about me 
(d) I don't want people to know this 
(e) if people know this they can't not think something bad 
about me 
(f) when I think about it, I can't not think the same" 
(g) when this person thinks this this person feels 
something bad 
(h) X felt something like this 
(i) because X thought something like this 
 
 
Embarrassment (X was embarrassed) 
(a) X felt something because X thought something 
(b) sometimes a person thinks: 
(c) "something is happening to me now not because I 
want it 
(d) someone knows about it 
(e) this person is thinking about me 
(f) I don't want people to think about me like this" 
(g) when this person thinks this, this person feels 
something bad 
(h) X felt something like this 
(i) because X thought something like this 
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As the first explication suggests, the Anglo concept of 'shame' 
links, so to speak, social concerns with a feeling of responsibility: people 
can think something bad about me because they can know something bad 
about me (most likely, that I did something bad). 'Embarrassment', 
however, is linked with the thought that some people can think something 
bad about me, but not because of something bad that they can know about 
me: they are here and can think something bad about me now because of 
something that happened to me right now (most likely, they saw what 
happened to me). There is no moral basis to 'embarrassment', then, but 
this doesn't make the feeling any less powerful.  
We could say, then, that the (Anglo) concept of 'shame' links 
social concerns with moral concerns, whether the modern Anglo concept 
of 'embarrassment' explicitly dissociates the two. In many other cultures, 
no such distinction is drawn. But the core components of "social 
emotions", postulated here (tentatively) as universal are relevant to both 
'shame' and 'embarrassment', as well as to those concepts (lexicalized in 
many other languages) which combine in one semantic entity ideas 
separated in English under shame, embarrassment, and also shyness. 
 
people can think something bad about me 
I don't want this to happen 
 
It is interesting to note that of the three potentially universal 
categories discussed here, two -"fear-like emotions" and "anger-like 
emotions"- correspond to two hypothetical "basic human emotions" 
which seem to "appear on every list" (Plutchik 1994:57), whereas the 
third one -"shame-like emotions"- does not. This fact may be due to the 
prevailing biological emphasis of the literature on "basic emotions", 
whereas the complex extending over "shame", "embarrassment", and 
"shyness" has clearly a social focus (although Darwin, (1872/1955) for 
one, did not hesitate to posit a biological basis for some "social 
emotions", linking "shame" with the biological phenomenon of blushing. 
See also Izard 1991; Tomkins 1987; Nathanson 1992). 
 
2.6. "Fear-like" emotions vs. "shame-like" emotions 
 
In an earlier work on the conceptualization of emotions 
(Wierzbicka 1986) I pointed out, with reference to Hiatt's (1978) work on 
"Australian Aboriginal Concepts", that not all languages appear to 
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distinguish, in their lexicons, "fear" from "shame". In particular, Hiatt 
(1978:185) pointed out that in the Australian language Gidjingali (now 
called Burarra) the same word -gurakadj- appears to cover, loosely 
speaking, both "fear" and "shame", and he described the following range 
of situations in which he recorded the use of this word: 
1. A meeting decides to put an end to two notorious killers. Two 
volunteers later make a surprise attack. When they report a successful 
outcome, a spokesman for their grateful countrymen replies: 'Good. Now 
we can sleep in peace, defaecate, urinate, go back to the camp, get up, 
urinate, defaecate, and so on, for we were afraid (ara-gurakadj-a) of 
those two men'. 
2. A baby cries as I approach a family group. His mother says: 'He is 
afraid (a-gurakadj-a) of you.' 
3. A woman says she was afraid (ng-gurakadj-ira) of encountering a 
ghost. 
4. A man sees a naked woman approaching. He feels embarrassed (a-
gurakadj-a). 
5. Gidjingali men are circumspect with respect to their mothers-in-law 
and sisters (they must not utter their names, look at them, go near them 
etc. (...) When asked why, a man replies that he is ashamed (ng-gurakadj-
a). 
6. In 1960 police arrested two young men for a felony committed in 
Darwin. At the time of their arrest, they were participating as novices in a 
Kunapipi ceremony at Maningrida, and as such were under strict 
injuction to keep away from women and children. After police had 
conducted them through the general camp, men spoke of the widespread 
shame/fear(?) that had been caused (ngubura-gurakadj-a). 
7. A man, on deciding that it is time to arrange his son's circumcision, 
speaks first to the lad's MMB (mother's mother's brother). He indicates 
that he does not wish to raise the matter with the boy's mother, as this 
would cause him (the boy's father) embarrassment (ng-gurakadj-a). 
(Hiatt 1978:185) 
Hiatt considers the possibility that in all situations the word in 
question implies both "fear" and "shame", but he rejects it as 
incompatible with some of the examples, and suggests instead a common 
core: "a strong impulse to retreat from the stimulus" (Hiatt, 1978:186).  
It is not quite clear, however, whether in Hiatt's view, the Burarra 
people do or do not distinguish two distinct emotions: something 
comparable to the English shame and something comparable to the 
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English fear. Although he looks for a common core he nonetheless 
repeatedly talks of "two emotions", for example: 
I have argued that, although situations arise among the Gidjingali 
in which fear and shame may be felt simultaneously, other situations 
occur in which only one or the other is present. Nevertheless, the same 
term is used in all three cases. Why should this be so? Perhaps it is 
because both emotions manifest a strong impulse to retreat from the 
stimulus, viz. snakes, ghosts etc. in the case of fear; mothers-in-law, 
sisters etc. in the case of shame. (Hiatt 1978-1:186 ) 
On the basis of Hiatt's data (confirmed by personal information 
from other linguists who have worked on Burarra and related languages) I 
concluded (in Wierzbicka 1986) that a distinction between "fear-like" 
emotions and "shame-like" emotions is probably not universal. 
In the intervening decade, however, a comprehensive Burarra 
dictionary has been published (Glasgow, 1994), which provides more 
information on the question and which allows us to see the situation in a 
different light. Most importantly, the dictionary shows that there are two 
different words in the language (the adverb gona and the verb gurkuja) 
which can be said to be associated with "an impulse to withdraw". While 
these two words are both glossed with reference to both "fear" and 
"shame", the primary gloss offered for gona is "ashamed", and the 
primary gloss offered for gurkuja is "show fear"; be frightened; be 
afraid". Both these primary glosses and the illustrative examples suggest 
that gona is in fact more "shame-like", and gurkuja more "fear-like". 
Particularly illuminating is the following example, in which both the 
putative "fear/shame" words occur:  
wurra an-ngaypa jawina gala barra a-gurkuja burrwa wurra 
gama gorlk rrapa minypa gona a-ni apula ngaypa rrapa gun-ngaypa 
janguny.  
'But my disciple must not be afraid of people and like be ashamed of me 
and my story.'  
 The word translated in this case as "afraid" is gurkuja and the 
one translated as "ashamed" is gona, and it seems that although "people" 
are mentioned in the first case, and not in the second, in fact the first 
word (gurkuja) implies the "fear-like" thought 'something bad can happen 
to me', whereas the second implies the "shame-like" thought 'people can 
think something bad about me'. 
This is not the place to undertake a detailed discussion of gona, 
gurkuja,
 and other related words in Burarra. From the data now available, 
however, it emerges that while the language doesn't have words 
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corresponding exactly to fear and shame, it does have two words which 
could be roughly described as "fear-like" and "shame-like" (bearing in 
mind that what is really meant is a contrast between a "fear-like" 
component "I don't want something bad to happen to me' and a "shame-
like" component 'I don't want people to think bad things about me').  
Available evidence suggests that the two Burarra concepts in 
question are indeed closer to one another than fear and shame are in 
English; nonetheless the Burarra data are not incompatible with the set of 
emotional universals proposed here. 
As Hiatt suggested, avoidance (the "strong impulse to retreat 
from the stimulus") is, no doubt, the key factor in the apparent closeness 
of the "fear-like" and "shame-like" emotion concepts in Australian 
languages. Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests that Burarra, like 
other Australian languages, does draw a distinction between, roughly 
speaking, "fear-like" feelings and "shame-like" feelings. 
 
2.7. "Good feeling" 
 
The three categories singled out here as possibly universal ("fear-
like", "anger-like" and "shame-like" feelings) may strike the reader as 
being all "negative": what about happier, more "joy-like" and "love-like" 
emotions? 
Before discussing such "happier" emotion concepts in any detail, 
let us note, first of all, that emotions labelled here as "anger-like" do not 
necessarily involve any "bad feelings" at all. In particular, the Ilongot 
concept of liget (as described by Michelle Rosaldo, 1980) is not 
necessarily linked with "bad feelings". 
The semantic component proposed here as the universal common 
core of the category in question is 'I don't want this; I want to do 
something because of this'. What is "negative" about this category is the 
volitive component 'I don't want this' (which it shares with "fear-like" and 
"shame-like" categories), but the "hedonic tone" of the emotion does not 
have to be negative ("bad").  
Turning to "positive" emotions like joy and happy, we must note, 
first of all, that some languages appear to rely largely on the collocation 
"feel good", and may not have any words comparable to joy and happy 
apart from this collocation.  
But of course, negative generalizations may be due to the 
limitations of our knowledge rather than to limitations in emotional 
lexicons. It is interesting to note, in this context, that the prediction 
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concerning Australian languages by Hiatt (1978:181) may have been 
overly negative: 
After inspecting a small number of lexicons, I predict that all 
Aboriginal languages possess words for the following emotional states: 
anger, fear, sorrow, jealousy, and shame. In the context of Aboriginal 
society, I would call them the dramatic emotions. Words referring to 
affection and contentment may also be widespread, though I suspect that 
in Australia the tranquil emotions have not obtained the same degree of 
verbal representation as their counterparts. 
In the intervening two decades a number of detailed dictionaries 
and descriptive studies of Australian languages have appeared which 
show that words for "positive feelings" (comparable to happy or joy) do 
exist in the languages in question (cf. Goddard 1990, and 1994, Evans 
1992, Henderson and Dobson 1994). Obviously, the matter requires 
further investigation. 
As for "love-like" emotions, in many languages words referring 
to them appear to be linked with thoughts of "bad things" happening to 
people, and so to be akin, in some ways, to "pity", "compassion", 
"sadness", and even "anguish" rather than to "happiness" or "joy". The 
Ifaluk concept of fago, glossed by Lutz (1988) as 
"love/sadness/compassion", is a good case in point, as is also the Russian 
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"sorrowful loving compassion" (cf. Wierzbicka 1992a; Zalizniak 1992). 
To illustrate, it will be useful to quote at some length what 
Levine (1981:110-111) says about the Nyinba language of Nepal: The 
Nyimba moral system includes no precept and provides no grounds for 
the evaluation of love in the generalized western sense. Nor is there any 
comprehensive term or concept to describe the idea of 'love', whether 
divine, parental or sexual. Although the relations between close kin, 
particularly parents and children, are informed by a special moral bond, 
the nature of this bond is not seen as a suitable topic for discussion and is 
thus poorly articulated. Parents speak of having a feeling of 'compassion' 
or 'compassionate love' (Tib. snying rje) for their children, but this, 
ideally, should be disinterested concern, comparable to the feeling of 
compassion prescribed towards all sentient beings by Buddhist ethics (...) 
Less commonly, parents may describe their children, as well as other 
close kin and friends, as persons 'they hold dear' (Tib. nga'i gce ba). This, 
like expressed sentiments of 'compassion', is typically applied to 
dependent and weaker persons. However, it also seems to imply a state of 
exclusive emotional attachment.  
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In the Nyimba moral system emotional attachments are identified 
with the desire for material goods and condemned as covetousness or 
greed (Tib. 'dod pa), considered one of the cardinal vices. All such 
attachments are thought to produce mental suffering, simply because they 
give rise to frustration and inevitable sorrow. Furthermore, this is a state 
of mind said to increase the individual's concern with wordly existence 
and thus to interfere with his pursuit of salvation. Sexual relationships are 
presumed to be especially conducive to the development of interpersonal 
attachments and to be motivated by -or to motivate- carnal desire, known 
as dödchag (Tib. 'dod chags; these are considered a type of 'dod pa). 
There is no other term which can be used to describe the sexual 'love' of 
husbands, wives or lovers; nor is there any positive valuation of this 
phenomenon. 
If we believe Levine (and other similar reports) we will have to 
accept that "love" (in the English sense of the word) is not a universal 
human notion. However, it seems possible that all languages have some 
word or words implying a desire to do good things for someone else, 
presumably modeled, prototypically, on the relationship between mothers 
(X) and their children (Y), and that this can represented as follows: 
person X wants to do good things for person Y 
It would be nice to be able to think that all languages have some 
words acknowledging a kind of feeling associated with "wanting to do 
good things for another person". At this stage, however, we do not know 
whether this is indeed so. 
In an earlier work (Wierzbicka 1992a:146-7) I have argued 
against the common assumptions that "love" is a universal human 
emotion, pointing out that the concept "love" is no more universal than, 
for example, the Ifaluk "fago", and I think the point is valid and 
important. I would now add that all languages may nonetheless recognise, 
lexically, a distinct type of emotion linked with the semantic component 
'person X wants to do good things for person Y'. But the matter requires 
further investigation. 
 
2.8. "Smile" and "cry" 
 
Turning now to the links between feelings and the body, we will 
note, first of all, that all languages appear to have some word or words 
comparable in meaning with smile or laugh, and some word or words 
comparable in meaning with cry or weep. 
54 Anna Wierzbicka 
The distinctions between 'smile' and 'laugh' or between 'cry' and 
'weep' are by no means universal, and the words described here as 
"comparable" to smile and laugh or cry and weep do not have to 
correspond to these in meaning exactly, but apparently some shared 
components can be identified. These components can be formulated as 
follows: 
cry/weep 
I think: something bad is happening 
I feel something bad 
smile/laugh 
I think: something good is happening 
I feel something good 
 
I have formulated the core meanings of smiling/laughing and 
crying/weeping in a first person mode, on the assumption that such 
behaviours can be (and usually are) interpreted as if they were messages. 
I will now turn to other bodily behaviours, which are normally assumed 
to be involuntary and which are likely to be interpreted as "symptoms" 
rather than "messages". 
 
2.9. Emotions described via external bodily symptoms 
 
It seems likely that in all languages one can talk about "emotions" 
by referring to externally observable bodily events and processes 
understood as symptoms of inner feelings. For example, in English one 
can say: 
She blushed. 
She got pale. 
Her hands were trembling. 
Her lips were trembling. 
Her eyes got round
 [with fear]. 
When I saw this, my palms started to sweat. 
 
and so on, intending such sentences to be understood as referring to 
emotions rather than only to bodily events. Presumably, the folk model 
behind such sentences can be interpreted as follows: 
 
something was happening to part Y of X's body  
people could see this 
because of this, people could know: 
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this person feels something now 
because this person thinks something now 
 
Unlike in the case of "smiling" and "crying", I am not suggesting 
that all languages will have special words referring to such symptoms. 
For example, while English has the special word blush, presenting a 
visible bodily process as a symptom of emotion, in many other languages 
(for example, in Russian) the closest equivalent of blush is simply 
something like "get red", with no special reference to emotions. What I 
think might be universal in this area, is the very fact that visible bodily 
events and processes (such as getting red in the face) may be treated as 
symptoms of emotions, that is, may be reported (in everyday discourse) 
with the intention of conveying information about a person's feelings 
(related to this person's concurrent thoughts). 
The descriptions of the symptoms referring to emotions can't be 
always literally translated into other languages, for their interpretation 
can be culture-specific (Cf. Iordanskaja 1986). For example, as pointed 
out by Hasada (1997), in Japanese a reference to "lowering one's eyes" 
(mejiri o sageru) would refer to feeling pleased or satisfied, as in the 
following sentence from a novel by Kobayashi:  
 
[Ero-jishi de aru] Subuyan kara denwa o uke, tachimachi MEJIRI O 
SAGERU kyaku bakari to wa kagiranu." 
E: True, some customers had to only receive a call from Subuyan [a 
pimp] to begin salivating (lit. 'lowering the edges of their eyes'). 
 
Hasada comments on this example as follows: Here the 
customers feel 'pleased' to get a call from Subuyan who introduced a girl 
to them.
 However, in English the description of this Japanese facial 
expression would not be translated word-for-word like "drawing down 
the edge of one's eyes". This is because the equivalent English facial 
expression does not convey the intended meaning of the expression in the 
original text. It is translated as "salivating", which only partially 
corresponds to the original meaning, since it implies the customer's 
positive response, but expresses it through a different part of body: the 
mouth. 
Similarly, in Chinese what is perceived as bodily symptoms of 
emotions are different from those recognized in English. For example, 
Chun (1996:3) cites the following expressions: 
la chang lian
 
→
 'pull a long face' 
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kua zhe lian
 
→
 lit. 'drop face' 
la xia lian
 
→
 lit. 'pull down face' 
bian lian
 
→
 lit. 'change face' 
 
and comments: "All the above expressions describe that one gets angry 
and that therefore his or her face is no longer the same, and usually it 
appears to be long". In addition, Chun (1996:4) quotes the following 
expressions, also understood as referring to what she describes as an 
"angry face": 
 
zhang hong le lian
 
→
 'swell up to red face' 
tie ching le lian
 
→
 'metal green face' 
lian hong buozi cu
 
→
 'red face thick neck' 
 
2.10. Emotions described via internal "bodily images" 
It seems likely that in all languages people can talk about 
cognitively-based feelings in terms of figurative "body images", referring 
to imaginary events and processes taking place inside the body, such as 
the following ones in English: 
 
When I heard/saw this, my heart sank. 
It
 [the news, etc.] broke my heart. 
I did it with a heavy heart. 
In contrast to the bodily "symptoms", discussed in section 2.9., 
bodily images presently under discussion combine similes (LIKE) with a 
counterfactual (AS IF) mode of thinking, roughly speaking along the 
following lines: X feels like a person who thinks [Y] and who feels 
because of this as if Z had happened in their body. More precisely, it can 
be represented as follows: 
 
I was boiling inside [with rage]. => 
at that time [e.g. when I heard/saw X] I thought something (Y) 
I felt something because of this 
I want someone to know how I felt 
because of this I say:something was happening inside my body 
I think if Z was happening inside a person's body 
this person could feel like this 
[I don't say Z was happening in my body] 
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For example, a person who says "I was boiling inside (with 
rage)" does not really think that if some water were actually boiling 
inside their body they would feel like they are feeling now; rather, this 
person is consciously using an image which seems intuitively effective, 
and which can be counted upon to be understood only as an image, not as 
an actual likeness. Some examples from languages other than English: 
 
POLISH 
serce mi p   ka 
heart to-me is-breaking 
'I experience painful emotions as if my heart were breaking' 
serce mi si     ciska 
heart to me REFL is-squeezing 
'I experience painful emotions, as if my heart were being 
squeezed' 
serce mi si   kraje 
heart to-me REFL is-cutting 
'I experience painful emotions, as if my heart were being cut to 
pieces' 
zrobi  o mi si   ci  ko na sercu 
it-got to-me REFL heavy-ADV. on heart 
'my heart got heavy' 
zrobi  o mi si   lekko na sercu  
'it-got to-me REFL. light-ADV. on heart' 
'I felt as if a burden lying on my heart were removed' 
 
MBULA (Austronesian; Bugenhagen 1990:205): 
kete- (i)malmal 'angry' (lit. 'liver fight') 
kete- (i)bayou 'very angry' (lit. 'liver hot') 
kete- (i)beleu 'uncontrollably angry' (lit. 'liver swirl') 
kete- pitpit 'get excited too quickly' (lit. 'liver jumps') 
kete- ikam keN 'startled' (lit. 'liver does snapping') 
kete- biibi 'too slow' (lit. 'liver is big') 
kete- kutkut 'anxious' (lit. 'liver beats') 
kete- iluumu 'at peace' (lit. 'liver cool') 
kete- pas 'out of breath' or 'lose one's temper' (lit. 'liver removes') 
kete- pa 	 ana 'calm, unmoved, long-suffering' (lit. 'liver is rock-
like') 
kete- ise 'aroused' (lit. 'liver goes up') 
kete- isu 'take a rest' (lit. 'liver goes down') 
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kete- pakpak
 'very angry' (lit. 'liver is sour') 
 
 For Chinese, Chun (1996) offers the following examples and 
comments: 
1. gan chang you dwang 
'one's liver and intestine are almost broken' 
"This expression is used to describe that someone is in great 
grief, misery or sadness. One can say 'someone is crying like gan chang 
you dwang'. 
2. xin ru dao ge 
'one's heart is painful like cut by a knife' 
"This expression is used to describe that one is in a very painful 
situation because of sadness, grief, or misery." 
3. wu zhang ju lie 
'five organs all broken' 
"This expression is used to describe that one is in great anger and 
that therefore his or her internal organs are all broken". 
4. xin ji ru fen 
'one's heart is anxious like burning'. 
"This expression describes that one is in great anxiety like fire 
burning". 
5. xia po dan 
"One's gallbladder is often linked with courage by the Chinese. If 
one is very courageous or brave, he or she is said to be hen you dan liang 
(have much gallbladder). On the contrary, if one is terrified badly, then 
he or she is said to be xia po dan (gallbladder broken from fear)". 
Finally, for Kayardild (an Australian language) Evans (1994:212) 
offers the expressions mildalatha bardaka 'feel grief stricken', which 
means literally 'cut through one's stomach'; and bardaka warriliija 'feel 
uneasy', which means literally 'stomach causes itself to go away'. 
 
2.11. The grammar of emotions
 
 
It seems likely that all languages draw some grammatical 
distinctions in the area of emotions, thus reflecting different perspectives 
on emotions, available to speakers within one culture. Roughly speaking, 
different constructions may present an emotion as "involuntary" or as 
"uncontrollable", or as "overwhelming" and "irresistible", or as "active" 
and in some sense "voluntary", and so on. 
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It is too early to say whether any such perspectives on emotions 
are universal, but the general statement -that speakers of any language 
have more than one mode for conceptualizing emotions- seems plausible 
enough. 
To illustrate. In English, the predominant way of describing 
emotions is by means of adjectives and quasi-participles: 
 
He was angry/sad/happy/afraid. 
She was worried/disgusted/surprised/amazed/ashamed. 
 
These adjectives and quasi-participles present the experiencer's 
emotion as a state. In some cases, however, there is also a verbal mode of 
expression, which implies a more active attitude on the part of the 
experiencer: 
 
She worried/grieved/rejoiced(archaic). 
 
What this "active" attitude means is that the experiencer is 
thinking certain thoughts for some time and thus is as it were generating 
certain feelings in himself or herself (a process which -though not 
necessarily voluntary- in principle could be stopped): 
 
X was thinking something for some time 
because of this, X felt something (Y) for some time 
Another grammatical construction allows speakers of English to 
talk of their feelings as overwhelming. This is done by means of a noun 
with the preposition in, which suggests a container image (cf. Wierzbicka 
1986; Mostovaja 1996): She was in panic/ in despair/ in ecstasy/ in 
agony. 
In other languages distinctions of this kind play a much greater 
role than they do in English. For example, Russian grammar includes the 
following three constructions for the description of, roughly speaking, 
"sadness" (see Wierzbicka 1990): 
 
1.On byl grusten. 
he-NOM.was-MASC sad-MASC 
2.Emu bylo grustno. 
he-DAT (it)was-NEUT sad(ADV) NEUT 
3. On grustil. 
he-NOM sad(VERB)-PAST.MASC 
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 All these sentences can be roughly glossed as 'he was 
sad', but in fact they differ in meaning. In particular sentence (2) 
implies that the sadness was involuntary and was, so to speak, 
"happening to the experiencer", whereas (3) implies active 
involvement by the experiencer, and suggests that he is bringing 
about his own sadness by thinking certain thoughts (and also, that 
he is somehow displaying it). The reality of these semantic 
differences is manifested in further grammatical facts, such as, 
for example, that the verb grustit' (infinitive), in contrast to the 
adjective grusten and the adverb grustno, takes the preposition o, 
characteristic of verbs of active thinking: 
 
'He was thinking about her.' 
6 On grustil o nej. 
'He was "saddening-himself" about her.' 
'He was making himself sad by thinking about her.' 
7 *On byl grusten o nej. 
'He was sad about her.' 
8 *Emu bylo grustno o nej. 
'He experienced sadness about her.' 
 
Finally, for Mbula, Bugenhagen (1990) lists as many as five different 
"experiential constructions", (in addition to "body images"), each 
suggesting a different conceptualization of emotions. For example, "fear" 
can be reported in the following three constructions, among others ("S" 
stands for "subject", PSR, for Possessor, and NMZ, for nominalization): 
 
N-io a   -moto. 
1S 1S-fear 
'I am afraid' 
Kuli-   i-moto 
skin-1S.PSR 3S-fear 
'Something makes me feel uneasy' (lit. something frightens my 
skin) 
Moto-   a-na i-kam yo. 
fear-NMZ-3S.PSR 3S-do/get 1S.ACC 
'I was terrified.' (lit. fear got me) 
(For numerous further illustrations, see e.g. Bugenhagen 1990, Ameka 
1990, Wierzbicka 1992a). 
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 What such grammatical facts suggest is that in all cultures people 
conceive of emotions as being experienced in many different ways, 
especially in relation to human will: in some emotions, the experiencer 
can conceive of himself/herself in a more or less agentive role, as a 
person in charge of the feelings, whereas in others, the experiencer 
perceives himself/herself as someone to whom something happens, 
independently of, or even against, their will. This flexibility in the 
interpretation of emotions may well be another emotional universal. 
 
3. Conclusion
 
 
Since all languages appear to have a word for the concept 'feel', 
we can assume that this concept is an integral part of the universal folk 
model of a person, that is, that in all cultures people attribute feelings to 
other people, as well as to themselves (cf. D'Andrade, 1994). 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that in all cultures people 
distinguish linguistically (and in particular, lexically) between different 
kinds of feelings. Apparently, in all languages some 'feelings' are 
lexically linked with 'thoughts' (in the form of words comparable in their 
over-all semantic structure to English words such as angry, afraid, or 
ashamed). 
It seems likely, too, that in all languages there are some words 
linking 'feelings' with the body, such as hungry, thirsty, and pain or hurt 
in English. 
In all languages, there also seem to be ways of speaking that link 
feelings based on thoughts with events or processes involving the body -a 
fact strikingly consistent with many scholars', especially psychologists', 
emphasis on the biological aspect of "emotions". First of all, these ways 
of speaking suggest that some externally observable bodily behaviours (in 
particular, facial behaviours) are seen universally as voluntary or semi-
voluntary modes of expressing and communicating cognitively based 
feelings (e.g. "cry/weep" and "smile/laugh"). Second, they suggest that 
some visible and/or audible (that is, also externally observable) bodily 
events and processes may be seen, universally, as involuntary symptoms 
of cognitively based feelings (such as, for example, blush in English). 
Third, all languages also appear to have conventional bodily images, that 
is, expressions referring to imaginary events (and processes taking place 
inside the body used as a basis for describing the subjective experience of 
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feelings assumed to be based on thoughts (such as my heart sank in 
English). 
It also appears that the major universal mode for describing 
cognitively based feelings is in terms of a comparison, that is, via LIKE, 
and that in this, the main human strategy for talking about feelings is 
analogous to the main human strategy for talking about colours. If gold 
(Adj.) means, essentially, 'looking like gold', and blue, 'looking like the 
sky (when one can see the sun) or like the sea (seen from afar)', so afraid 
means, roughly, 'feeling like a person who thinks: something bad can 
happen to me, I don't want it', and heart-broken means, roughly, 'feeling 
like a person who thinks: something very bad happened to me, and who 
feels because of this as if their heart were broken'. 
While internal bodily images focus on the subjective aspect of 
feelings and on their possible links with essentially unknowable 
processes going on inside the body, the full cognitive scenarios 
associated with certain kinds of feelings often point to social and moral 
concerns, and to aspects of interpersonal interaction. For example, they 
reflect concerns about "bad things happening to someone", or about 
"good things happening to someone else (and not to me)", about 
"someone doing something bad", about "someone wanting to do good 
things for someone else", or about "other people thinking something bad 
about me". 
This mode of discourse, referring to feelings but linking them 
with evaluative and "people-oriented" cognitive scenarios, is of course 
highly compatible with the emphasis of anthropologists such as Lutz 
(1988) or White (1992) on the social, interpersonal, and moral character 
of discourse about "emotions" in many non-Western societies, and on the 
culture-specific nature of the modern Western (especially Anglo-
American) "therapeutic" discourse, with its focus on introspection into 
one's subjective internal states. 
Feelings are subjective, and they appear to be universally thought 
of (at times) as related to what is happening in the body; but they are also 
often thought of as based on certain recurrent thoughts — cognitive 
scenarios shaped by the particular culture. 
Since in common human experience the content of feeling-
provoking thoughts influences the feeling, one can legitimately say that 
not only "emotion-concepts" but feelings themselves are also influenced 
by culture. Since, furthermore, in common human experience cognitively-
based feelings often trigger or influence bodily feelings, it makes sense to 
Emotional Universals 63  
suggest that bodily feelings, too, (and perhaps even some bodily 
processes associated with them) may be indirectly influenced by culture. 
There is no real conflict between the view that human feelings 
can be "embodied" and have a biological dimension and the view that 
they are "socially constructed" and have a cultural dimension. There is 
also no real conflict between a recognition of cross-cultural differences in 
the area of "emotions" and a recognition of similarities. 
There can be no doubt that the ways of thinking and talking about 
feelings prevalent in different cultures and societies (and also different 
epochs; cf. e.g. Stearns & Stearns 1986) exhibit considerable diversity; 
but neither can there be any doubt about the existence of commonalities 
and indeed universals. The problem is how to sort out the culture-specific 
from the universal; how to comprehend the former through the latter; and 
also, how to develop some understanding of the universal by sifting 
through a wide range of languages and cultures rather than by 
absolutizing modes of understanding derived exclusively from our own 
language. 
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